China’s cybersecurity relations have rarely been more complicated than they are today. Beijing is presently subject to a significant level of criticism, with cybersecurity taking a leading role in the attention it receives from the United States (U.S.). For its part, the U.S. is struggling to respond to China for a number of reasons. First, there is a problem of attribution, as linking an attack to an individual or country is often a difficult technical problem[1]. Secondly, corporate entities are reluctant to disclose attacks. And finally, there is no agreed upon framework as to how an attack fits within a threat matrix[2]. These factors contribute to an ambiguous cybersecurity environment wherein it becomes difficult to assess a state’s intentions. Thus, with this perspective, a response against Beijing on this subject becomes a difficult task.
In international politics, when one thinks of effective arms control measures they generally stick to identifiable events. It is relatively straightforward to identify a nuclear explosion or a large scale conventional military invasion. It is also usually possible to discover who is responsible for these actions and categorize them within in the understanding of threat. For example, when employing the term ‘invasion’ or ‘declaration of war’, there is an immediate communicated understanding of the context that propels such actions. In contrast, modern international security undermines such classifications. For example, it is known that Russia is operating in Ukraine but the terms we use to describe those activities are greyer than say, identifying the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. This creates the ambiguity in classifying cyber attacks. For the full article click here
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